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I. INTRODUCTION

Pickering v. Board of Education, 1 a foundational case in public
employment law, prominently foreshadowed the coming prominence of
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in constitutional law. Under
that doctrine, the Supreme Court limits a govemment actor, such as a
government employer, from being able to condition govemmental benefits,
such as public employment, on the basis of individuals' forfeiting their
constitutional rights. It would thus seem to follow that a public employee
should not have to sacrifice constitutionally protected rights in order to
enjoy the benefits and privileges of public employment. Yet, today, that
is far from the actual case.
Rather, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been applied in a
notoriously inconsistent manner over the last forty years , and not
just in the public employment arena. 2 Indeed, for jurists, scholars,
and practitioners alike, the doctrine continues to be one of the thorniest
issues in American constitutional law, and nowhere more so than in the
context of public employment, where since the days of Pickering, the
meaning of unconstitutional conditions for public employees has taken
several dramatic, unpredictable, and less-than-beneficial tums. 3
The doctrine of uncon titutional conditions in public employment has
figured most notably in Fir t Amendment free speech4 and freedom of
association cases. 5 In the free peech context, the Court has developed
the Connick!Garcetti/Pickering doctrinal analysis.6 Taken together,
1. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc. 391 U.S. 563 ( 1968).
2. See Seth F. Kreimer, AllocationDl Sanctions: The P roblem of Negative 5LJKWV
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. 5 H Y  1293 1304 ( 19 4) (ob erving that unconstitutional
conditions decision "manifest>@ an incon istHncy so marked a to make a legal realist of
almost any reader").
3. See Ja on Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 80 1, 0 (2003).
4. See, e.g. , GarceWWi v. Ceba llos, 547 U.S. 410, 4 17 (2006); Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.. 668 674 (1996)· Waters v. hu rchill    U.. 661 , 671
(1994) (plurality opinion); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85 ( 19 7); Connick
v. Myers 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983); Givhan v. W. Line 'onsol. ch. Dist. 439 U..
    412-13 (1979); Mt. Heal thy City ell. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle 429 U. . 274
284 (1977).
5. See, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720
(1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 73 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 508 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S . 589,591-92 (1967).
6. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 .
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these three cases forbid public employers from taking adverse employment
action again t employee for peaking out on "matters of public conceUQ,"7
but only if the employee is not peaking pursuant to the employee's
official duti es and lhen only if the employee can prevail under a
constitutional balancing test. 9 Needless to say, it is quite a gauntlet a public
employe has to negotiate to ucceed on a First Amendment free speech
claim. 10
So why have Fi_r t Amendment public employee speech rights, which
have traditionally enjoyed protection under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions suddenly diminished in recent years? 11 Three interrelated
developments explain tbi tate of affairs. First, a jurisprudential school
of thought termed the ' ubsidy school" has significantly undermined the
vitality of the XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO conditions doctrine through its largely
successful sparring with an alternative school of thought, the "penalty
chool."
econd, although initially developed in the government-assovereign context, this subsidy approach to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has now infiltrated the govermnent-as-employer context and
eviscerated large parts of the Pickering holding. Third, and most
significantly, the nature of the ubsidy argument in WKH government-asemployer context ha morphed into the govemment speech doctrine,
WKURXJK which the government employer claims the speech of its employees
as it own and regulates it freely. It is this OD t tep that I refer to as the
Court's neoformalism in handling these con titutional is ues. 12 Instead
7. See onnick, 461 U.S. at 143. The ourt's attempW to define the meaning of
matters of public concern" in Connick has alone led to an academic cottage industry.
See Pau l M. ecu nda 7 K H (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The
Constltutionafization Rf Public Employee Rights to 'HFLVLRQDO Non-Jntetference in
Private $IIDLUV 40 U. . DAVIS L. 5HY 85, 02 n. 2 (2006) (collecting ca e that di cuss
the problems as ociatcd with the Connick "matter of public concern" test).
8. See Garcetri 547 U.. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make
statements SXUVXDQW to their official duties W K H employees are not spea\<ing as citizens for
First Amend men! purpo cs, DQG the onstitlttion doe not insulate WKHLU collliDunications
from emp loyer discipline.').
9. See Pickering, 391 U.. at 568.
l 0.
ee Paul M. Secunda Whither the Pickering Rights RI)HGHUDOEmployees? 79
U. CoLO. . REv. 1101. 1107- 11 (200 ) (recounting the difliculty for public employees
of ur iving the complicated five-step free speech analysis).
11 . See Mazzone upra note 3 DW 8 10- 16 reviewing a number of Supreme outt
cases that establish that "[t]hc doctrine of unconstitutional conditions ha been PRVW
vigorously applied in the fi rst Amendment ca Hs").
12. Thi Article docs not claim any connection with any other fanner use of the
word neofoUPalism in the constitutional, contract or commercial law literature. ee,
e.g., Jolm E. Murray. Jr. Con tract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 7 1 FORDHAM
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of merely applying a legal principle in a mechanistic or categorical
manner, this new fom1 of fom1alism concems itself more with the fonnal
ability of individuals to exercise constitutional rights, though practical
realities may strongly suggest that cunent realities may significantly
interfere with such rights . It is this neoformalism that explains how the
once-vital doctrine of 1mconstitutional conditions has come under attack
and the long-buried right-privilege distinction in constitutional law has
reemerged.
In order to more concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and its recent distortions, this Article conducts an indepth exploration of the ca e that started it all : Pi ·kering v. Boctrd of
Education. Although the RXUW decided this ca in Marvin Pickering's
favor, 14 th re ulting framework has, over the year. been interpreted by
the Supreme Court in a manner that significantly limits public employee
free speech rights. In fact, this same unconstitutional conditions doctrine
has been utilized in the government-a - overeign context to dilute other
constitutional rights of citi.zens. 15 What wa once developed to shut the
door on the infamous right-privHege G L tinction16 has now been increasingly
used to rob individuals of First Amendment and other constitutional
rights. Indeed, when one also considers the neoformalist use of the
government speech doctrine, the civil liberties of public employees in
this area oflaw may be at an all-time low.
This Article is divided into seven Parts . Part II defines and
explores the development of the neofonnalist approach by a group of
conservative Justices. Part III then delves into the story behind the
dispute that led eventually to the Supreme Court's landmark penalty case
of Pickering v. Board of Education, which established a robust fonn of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employee free speech
L. R EV. 869, 89 1 (2002) (d iscussing methods for discerning busincs agreements and
obOigations)· Lawrence B. Solum, The upreme Courl in Bondage: &RQVWLWXWLRQDO WDUH
Decisis, Legal Formalism. and the Future of UnenumeUDWHGRights 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
155 , 159 (2006) (using the term to describe a revival of fo rmalist ideas in debating the
role of precedent in constitutional adjudication)· William J. Woodward Jr., Neoformalism in
a Real :RUOG of Forms, 200 1 WI . L. REV. 97 1, 1004 (200 1) (examining W K H HIIHFWWKDW
IRUPDOrules proposed in contract FholarsKip would have on the diverse and complex
real world of contract ). Neoformalism, a used herein, mean Vimply a new type of
IRUPDOLV W thought that ha V helped to revive the right-privilege dist·inction in public
employment law.

13. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See generDOO\ Will iam W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RighW-Privilege
Distinction in Con WLWXWLRQDO Law, 81 HARV. L. R EV . 1439, 1445- 5 ( 1968) (discussing
various means by which the U. . Supreme Court has mitigated the "harsh con cquence

of the right-privilege di tin tion").
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cases. Part IV then relates how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
first came under attack in the government-as-sovereign context through
the increasing use of the subsidy line of argument by conservative
Justices in these cases. Next, Part V describes the infiltration of the
subsidy argument into the government-as-employer context post-Pickering
and how the penalty version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
has been distorted by this emerging neoformalism. Part VI illustrates
how this neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights has made
the govemment less transparent and accountable because public employees
are no longer secure in speaking their minds about their public employment.
Con equently it argue IR r the restoration of Pickering, its constitutional
balancing tandard , and th p nalty ver ion of lhc w1con titutionaJ
condition doctrin . Only when g vernment actions that practically
truncate the con titutional right of public employee are not tolerated
will public employees be able to again assume the role f the vanguard
of the citizenry protecting fellow citizen IUom govemm nt fraud :a te
and abuse.

II.

NEOFORMALISM AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

A noted above th Supreme ourt limit a government actor from
conditioning governmental b nefit ba ed on individual forfeiting their
con titutional right under the doctrine of uncon titutional c ndition .17
Yet through the recent a cendancy of tbe government peech doctrin in
combination with the embrac of the . ubsidy version of the uncon titutional
condition doctrine the Rehnqui t and Roberts ourt ha largely
cvi cerated the protection again t government implementation f
unconstitutional conditi n in distributing g vemmenllarge e.
In thi regard th e ourt have adopted a new version f formali m
or neoformalism to achieve the e end . Conceptually neoformali m
refer to tho e legal theorists and judges who look for theirs ietal ideal
in what ha come b fore: " rooted in the past- /a terre et /es morts- a
maintained by Gennan histRUicists or French theocrats, or neoConservatives in English-speaking coWltries." 18 However, whereas more
17. See Mitchell N. Be rman, Coercion Without Baselin es : Unco nsritutiona{
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J.  2- 3 (200 I). But see id. at 9 (criti cizing
the common defi nition of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as not being ve1y
useful).
18. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE P ROPER STU DY OF M ANKIND:
AN A NTHOLOGY OF E SSAYS 191 , 241 (Heruy Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 2000).
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traditional forms of legal formalism seek to "identify ... foundational
principles, deduce legal rules from them, [and] then apply those
rules syllogistically to resolve individual disputes," 19 this new formalism
concerns itself with the formal ability of individuals to exercise
constitutional rights fUee fUom physical restraint, though practical realities
may suggest significant interference with the exercise of those rights. It
is this neoformalism that explains how the once-vital doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has come to languish.
Take, for instance, the constitutional rights of public employees. 20
Through a number of decisions over the past four decades, the Supreme
Court has drastically cut back on the ability of public employees to
exercise rights to speech, privacy, and equal protection. In the First
Amendment free speech context, the dynamic can be seen most plainly.
In fact, the Court initiated a historical formalistic move in the case of
Garcetti v. Ceballos by adopting the foundational pUinciple that public
employees must be considered as either employees or citizens, but never
both. 21 From that foundational principle, legal rules have been deduced
such that public employees in their citizen role enjoy robust free speech
protections, 22 while those acting purely as employees have absolutely no
such rights. 23 Finally, those rules are applied syllogistically in individual
cases, so that employees who engage in speech pursuant to their official
job description are automatically treated as individuals with no free
speech rights and subject to employer discipline for their expression? 4
As others and I have argued elsewhere, this type of traditional
formalism is troubling. 25 However, the neoformalism of the cuUUent
19. Morgan loud The FourWh AmendmeQW During rhe Lochner Era: Privacy,
ProperWy. and /Lberty in &RQVWLWXWLRQDOTheRU\ 48 TAN . .L. R EV. 555 567 ( 1996).
20. This is an excepti.onally importam area for the uncon titutionaJ condition
doctrine because "[a] common benefit be towed by the government is employment.
Public employment therefore repre ents a con VWDQW opportunity for the government to
persuade individuals to give up certain First Amendment protections in exchange for a
regular paycheck." See Mazzone supra note 3, at 8 10.
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
22. See ity or an Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) ("[W]hen
government employees peak or write n their own time on topics unrelated to their
employment the speech can have first Amendment protection, absent some government
justification 'far trongcr tha n mere peculation' in regulating it." (quoting United States
v. aW'O Treasury Em p . Union, 5 13 U.S. 454,465 (1.995))).
23. Garcetti,547U.S.at421-22.
24. /d. at 421 ("[W@hen public employees make statements pursuant to their
RIILFLDO duties, the employeeV D U H not speaking a FLWL]HQV IRU First Amendment purposes
and the onstitution docs not in ulatH their conm1tmication from employer discipline.").
HH, e.g., harles W. "Rocky Rhodes, Public Employee peech Righls Fall
25.
Prey lo D Q EmeUging 'RFWULQDO Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.  173, I 74
(2007); Paul M. ecunda, *DUFHWWL 's lmpaci on the Firs/ Amendment Speech Rights of
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDM ( T L. REV. 117, 123 (200 ).
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Court is far more insidious and may potentially have a much larger
impact on the constitutional rights of both public employees and all
citizens. Neofonnalism's focus is on whether individuals' constitutional
rights will be fonnally interfered with by the government's conditioning
benefits on individuals taking certain actions. In other words, neoformalists
emphasize the formal opporttmity that individuals have to exercise their
constitutional rights without considering the practical realities of
whether the government benefit program in question inappropriately
penalizes individuals for the exercise of those constitutional right or
makes it nearly impossible to exercise those rights given their personal
circumstances.
Neofonnalism can be seen as deriving most directly from an ongoing
debate between two jurisprudential schools of thought about the
longstanding and cryptic unconstitutional conditions doctrine: the penalty
school and the subsidy school. The subsidy line of thought appears to
derive from the belief that differential subsidization by the govemment
is permissible as long a aformal opportXQity toe .erci e constitutional
rights exists outside the program in another fon.tm. 26 ubsidy school
adherents, mostly con ervative-oriented Ju tices, maintain that as long as
individuals are not foUPally compelled in not ex rcising their constitutional
rights, the government is under no obligation to ubsidize the exerci e of
those tights. Under this subsidy version of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, in contexts as different as abortion funding to the provision of
tax exemptions to public employment, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has become largely W R R W K O H V V in recent yea r becau e government
actors simply compel a given result by aying they are doing nothing but
subsidizing-or not sub idizing-a rigbt that a citizen or public employee
already ha. under the Con titu.tion. 27 Under thes circum VWDQFHV if the
government can constitutionally induce a result throu gh the conditi ning

26. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (applying the subsidy approach
in the abortion-funding FRQWH[W 
27. See ) C v. League of Women Voters 46 U. . 364, 407 (1984) (Rehnquisr
J. di scnting) ("> W]hcn the Government i simply exercising it's power· to allocate it
own public fund , [the Court) need on ly find that the condition imposed haV a UDWLRQDO
relation hip to Congress purpo e in pr vidi ng the subsidy and that i not primari ly
'aimed at the VXSSUHVVLRQ of dangerou ideas.'" (q uoting mmarano v. United taLe ,
358 U. . 498, 513 19  Doug!a . J. concmring))): Regan v. Taxation wi th
Reprc entation, 461 U.. 540, 544 ( 1983).
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of a government benefit, it need not worry about directly compelling the
result. 28
pecifically focu ing on the constitutional rights of public employee ,
the sub idy Justices are in e sen e aying that public employment is
 ub idized' by the government and thu V the government i entitled to
say what it wi h through its government employee witboul worry of
Fir tAm ndment implication . Thi i W K H meaning of the government
speech doctrine in its neofRUmalistic form, and its most troubling aspect
may be the reinvigoration of the long-ago dismissed right-privilege
distinction in constitutionallaw. 29
Conversely, the penalty Justices in these same cases maintain just as
strongly that such subsidization significantly and practically coerces
individuals with regard to their constitutional rights. 30 So, under the
penalty chool, traditionally adl1ered to by more progre sive Justice
government may not penaJize individual for exercising constitutional
rights by withdrawing various government benefit uch as tax exemptionV
government funding, or public employment. $V Ju lice Brennan maintained
i11 one of the first of the e cases over fifty year ago, ' [the government
program's] deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them
for this speech." 31 The seminal public employee free speech case of
Pickering v. Board of Education is a penalty case and establishes a strong
form of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 32
Yet, since the days of Pickering, it appears that public employees are
no longer being considered both employees and citizens. 33 Under the
Connick/Garcetti/Pickering doctrinal analysis, 34 public employers are
See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Karin B. Hoppmann, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better
'HILQLWLRQ of the Pickering!Connick Thre hold Test, 50 V AND. L. REv. 993, 998 (1997)
28.
29.

("Under the rights/privilege approach . . . . [t]he Court reasoned that since public
employment i a privilege granted by the government and not a right itself, the public
employee could not during that employment, claim absolute rights otherwise guaranteed
a private citizen. Th refore, freedom of speech, though established as a universal right
in W K
on titution, did not apply a such fo r those labeled 'employees."').
30. Rust, 500 U.S . at 216 (Biackmun, J., dissenting) ("By suppressing medically
pe1iinent infom1ation and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to
considerations of matemal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the
path of Title X clients' freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment
rights.").
31. Speiserv. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,518 (1958).
32. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U. . 563 (1968 .
33. The ourt does however still pay lip service to the ideal. See, e.g., City of
San Diego . Roc, 543 U.S. 77 , 0 (2004) (per curiam ("A government employee does
not relinquish all first mendment rights othciWise enjoyed by citizens ju t by reason of
his or her employment." (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605- 06
(1967))).
34. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983); Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.
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only forbidden from taking adverse employment action against
employees for speaking out on "matters of public concem. " 35 However,
if the employees are speaking pursuant to their official duties, they lose
all constitutional rights in their speech. 36 The Court has achieved this
reintroduction of the right-p1ivilege distinction into the law by contending in
its more recent public employee free speech decision Garcetti v. Ceballos
that the govemment employer is not conditioning public employment on
the public employees' forfeiting their rights to speech but instead is
merely requiring its speech-in the mouth of its employee-be used to
promote the particular policies for which the employee was hired. 37
This A1ticle therefore suggests that the First Amendment public
employee speech rights, which have traditionally enjoyed protection
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, have suddenly diminished
in recent years through the largely successful jurispmdential sparring
between the subsidy school and the penalty school. In order to more
concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
and its recent dist01tions by these neofonnalistic trends, this Article first
conducts an in-depth exploration of the penalty case of Pickering v.
Board of Education. 38 Although the Court decided this case in Marvin
Pickering's favor, the resulting framework has, over the years, been
interpreted by the Supreme &RXUW in a manner that significantly limits
public employee free speech rights. To understand its erosion in the
government-as-employer context, however, it is first necessary to
understand the growing preeminence of the subsidy school of thought in
unconstitutional conditions cases in which the government acts in its
sovereign capacity. It is those principles from the sovereignty context
that have now infiltrated the government employment context and
explain the resulting neoformalism that has taken hold there and cut
away vast amounts of constitutional protections for public employees.
In both sovereignty and employment contexts, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, once developed to shut the door on the infamous
right-privilege distinction, has now been resurrected to rob individuals of
First Amendment and other constitutional rights.

35.
36.
37.
38.

See Connick, 461 U.S . at 142.
See Garcelli, 547 U.S . at 421.
!d. at42J - 23.
Pickering, 391 U .S. 563 .
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Ill. PICKERiNG V. BOARD OF EDUCAT,21?9

Marvin Pickering is n w an energetic and spirited septuagenarian. In
1964 he was a recently mjnted bigh school science teacher with a strong
desire to teach tudent and an idealistic view on the LPSRUWDQFH of
citizen engagement in representative government. He never expected
that his name would one day become synonymous with the U.S. Supreme
&RXUW Vmost important modem case on public employee speech rights.

A. The Background Events Leading to Pickering
As a y ung man 3LFNering made his way to lllin i and did his
tudent WHDFKLQJat Downer Grove oulh High chool in !he suburb of
Chicago. That experi Hn e was foJlowed by the c mpletion of hi fir t
year of teaching cience at Lyons Town hip South High cho I at o in
the Chicago suburbs.
In 1959, Lockport Township Central High School hired Pickering to
teach science. 40 He was twenty-three years old. In the next five years,
he became active in community and school politics. During that time, he
often attended the Board of Education of Township High School District
205 (Board) PHHWLQJV and became familiar with the problems the Board
was having in addre sing variou chool-related issues, LQFOXGLQJhow to
deal with a rapidly growing student population and the need to raise
taxe to build new facilities. By 1964, !he Board and other teachers
knew that Pickering was one who freely spoke his mind on a variety of
topics, especially when he thought some chool policy wa unfair. TI1e
dispute between Pi keri.ng and the Board over how tbe latter was
spending funds on alh letic rather than on chool material and teacher
salaries seemed to be j ust another instance f Pickering's peaking his mind
on something about which he passionately cared.
That dispute, however, tumed out to change the constitutional landscape
for millions of public employees in the United States. On October 8,
1964, the Board of Education of Township High School District 205 in
Will County, Illinois, fired teacher Marvin Pickering for writing a
blistering editorial about the Board and Superintendent published in the
39. Unle s otherwise indicated, the underlying story in this Part i drawn from the
IROORZ ing sources: PickerLQJ 39 1 U. . 563Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 225 .. 2d  (Ill.
1967), r ev 'd, 91. U.. 563; Transcript of Oral Argument' Pickering, 39  U.. 563 (No.
510); Marvin L. Pickering, Marvin L. Pickering- The Man unpublished autobiography)
(on file with author); and (PDLO from Marvin Pickering to Pau l HFXQGD Assoc.
Profes or of Law, Mnrqueuc Univ. Law 'ch. (Mar. 5 20 0 7:50 ST) (on I L O H with
author).
40. Township High School 'LVWULFW205 is located in the town of Lockport, Illinois,
near the city of Joliet, about an hour southwest of Chicago .
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local Lockport Herald.4 1 The letter addres ed a eric of four tax
referenda initiated and upported by the Board f Education, which
ought to allocate tax money for a variety of chool-related purpo es. 42
Pickering believed that W K H Board and Superintendent had EXQJOHG the
matter and that tax money wa better spent on teacherV alary funding
for hoollunchc for nonathlete and educationa l need generall y.
He wrote in pertinent part, in this letter to the editor of eptember 24,
1964:
Dear Editor:
I enjoyed reading the back issues of your paper which you loaned to me.
Perhaps others would enjoy reading them in order to see just how far the two
new high schools have deviated from the original promises by the Board of
Education .. ..
ince there seems to be a problem gelling all the facts to the voter on the twice
defeated bond issue, many lcllcrs have been written to this pap r and probably
more will follow, J feel I mu t ay something about tl1e letters and their writer .
Many of the e I ttcrs did not give the whole story. /HWWHUV by your B ard and
Administration have tntcd that tcachet.' alarie total 1,297,746 for one year.
Now that mu t have been th total payroll, otherwise the teacher would be
getting 0,000 a year. I teach at the high chool and , know this just i ·n't the
case. llowcver, this hows their 'stop at nothing ' atti tude. To illustrate fi.trther,
do you know that the superintenden t told the tHachHU and I quote $Q\ teacher
that oppose the referendum hould be prepared for the consequcnc HV. ' I think
41. Pick ring' editorial was publi hed n September 24, 1964, just two weeks
prior to his firing. Letter from Marvin Pickering to Editor, Lockport Herald (Sept. 24,
1964) (on file with the Lockport Public Library). As discussed below, the lllinois
6upreme ourt reproduced the letter in whole in irs majority opinion in Pickering. At
the time, the Lockport Herald had 2900 ub cribcr  See Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 39.
42. There were four suc h referenda involving simila r issu es over a three-year
period. In early 1961,
the voters of the school district turned down a proposal for the issuance of
$4,875,000 in school building bonds to erect two new schools to accommodate
freshmen and sophomores only to feed existing LockpRUt Central High School,
which was then to accommodate j uniors and seniors only. Upon defeat, this
program wa discarded.
Pickering, 225  (Gat 2. Subsequently, later in 1961,
the v ters approved the issuance of such bonds in the amount of $5,500,000 to
erect two new chools, one (Lockport East) to accommodate freshmen and
sophomores only, which was to operate as a feeder school to Lockport Central,
and the other (LockpOJt West) to be a full four year high school. Existing
Lockport Central was then to accommodate juniors and seniors only on the
East side of the district.
/d. "In 1964, proposals to increase the educational and WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ tax rates were
twice defeated, on May 23 and on September 19." Jd. at 8 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
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this gets at the reason we have problems passing bond issues. Threats take
something away; these are insults to voters in a free society. We should try to
sell a program on its merits, if it has any.
As I see it, th e bond is ue is a fight between the Board of ducmion that is
WU\LQJ to push WD[x-supportHd aU1lctic down our throats with educa tion, and a
public that has mix d emotions about both of these items bcca u e they feel they
are already SD\LQJ enough iaxes and imply don 't know whom to trust with any
more tax money .
I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher, since
that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the administration. Do you
really know what goes on behind those stone walls at the high school?
Respectfully, Marvin L. Pickering. 43

So, in summary, the superintendent of the Lockport schools, Dr.
William Blatnick, had first sent a letter to the editor of the local newspaper
in support of one of the tax referenda. Pickering responded with the
letter above, with many accusations of misfeasance and suggesting the
Board was placing athletics above teachers' salaries and education
generally. Not surprisingly, the Lockpmt School Board viewed Pickering's
public statements as insubordination. The Board decided to dismiss
Pickering on October 8, 1964, but did hold a hearing on the dismissal, as
required under the Illinois state tenure law.
The same seven-member, elected Lockpmt School Board that had
already decided to dismiss Pickering held a hearing over two days in the
Lockport East High School library in November 1964. Of course,
Pickering was not surprised when the Board unanimously decided, on
December 7, 1964, to terminate him because the Board acted as judge,
MXU\ and prosecutor during the hearing. The Board concluded that
numerous statements in the letter were false and it was in the "best
interests of his school" to dismiss him from employment. 44
Pickering's last day of employment was the beginning of Christmas
vacation, 1964. During his time away from Lockport Central High
School, which period would end up lasting nearly five years, Pickering
initially worked for the Campbell Soup Company as a food processing
supervisor and then later in the Uniroyal-Joliet Arsenal in the Production
Training Department.

43. !d. at 2-4 (majority opinion). Much of the lllinois Supreme Court majority
decision is spent WU\LQJ to establish that Pickering's allegations were false or misleading
and therefore the Board 's termination of his employment had been justified because he
had not acted in the "best interests" of the school when he wrote this letter. !d. at 4-7
("A teacher who displays disrespect toward the Board of Education, incites
misunderstanding and distrust of its policies, and makes unsupported accusations against
the officials is not promoting the best interests of his school, and th e Board of Education
does not abuse its discretion in dismissing him .").
44. !d. at 6-7.
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After being terminated from his $6900-per-year school teaching job,45
Pickering did not take the School Board's actions against him lying
down. He first petitioned the Board and delivered 1260 signatures in
support of his continued employmeot.46 Next, he contacted the American
Federation of Teachers (AFT) at it Chicago national headquarter .47
The AFT pledged a fight to the fini h for his cause.48 The AFT appointed
well-known civil rights litigator John Ligtenberg, of Chicago s Ligtenb rg
Goebel & DeJong, to defend him. 49
Pickering, then twenty-eight years old, challenged the Board's
termination decision in the Will County Circuit Court in January 1965,
arguing that his free speech rights had been violated by the Board's
actions. 5° At the time, Pickering stated, "A man doesn't give up his right
to freedom of speech when he becomes a school teacher."51 Superintendent
Blatnick responded: "We don't question his right to write letters. We
just say that they should be WUXHstatements. " 52
In March 1966, white Pickering was still working at Campbell Soup,
Will County Circuit Court Judge Michael A. Orenic held in favor of the

45. Nonnan Glubok, Teacher Who Lost Job for Speaking Out Will Sue Board,
WA II. P T Dec. 21 1964, at 15.
46. Pickering, supra n tc 39.
47. ''(The AFT's 1 activity in niding individual teachers in academic IUeedom

disput ha been d hoc in nature, limited to supplying legal and financial aid for
teachers eeking relief in the FRXUWV Developments in the /DZ$FDGHPLF Freedom, 81
+ D U Y  L. REv. 1045 1121 (1968) (citing /HWWHU from John Ligtenberg, Gen. oun el
Am. Fed'n of Teachers, to th llorvard Law Review (D c. 22 1967) (on file with the
Harvard Law Review)).
48. Union To +HOS Fired 7HDFKHUin ourt Fight, HI . TRI%. Jan. 15, 1965 at 09.
49. John Ligtcnberg was DO o the general coun el of the FT DWthe time. !d.
Ligtenberg already had a national reputation, having ubmitted an amicu brief for the
AFT in Brown v. Board of Educarion, 347 U. . 4 3 ( 1954). He would later go on to
argue the important due proces employment law case of 3HUU\ v. indermann 408 U..
593 1972), which extended due pr cc VV protection to tcnnination of govemmcnt
employees, and to submit amicu briefs in OHYHODQGBoard of Education . Lafleur, 414
U.S. 632 ( 1974), n brief with now-Ju tice Ruth Dadcr Gin burg, which struck d wn a
re tricrive matcmity leave requirement that effectively served to puni h women for
exer i ing their right to bear children, and Board of Regents v. Roth 408 U.S. 564
(1972) which found a university teacher plaintiff did not have a prop rty inlerc W in
continued employment.
50. Fired Teacher Files SuiWTo Be Reinsrated + ,  TRIB. Jan. 7, 1965, at W3 .
51. Glubok, supra note 45 .
52. Jd.
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Board. 53 Judge Orenic concluded that "[t]he greater public interest of
the schoo Is ovenides the issue of freedom of speech rights of a teacher. " 54
Pickering then bypassed the Illinois Appellate Court and filed for
review of the Circuit &RXUW V decision with the Illinois Supreme Court.
He based his challenge on free speech and denial of due process claims
under the First and Fomieenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
After oral argument of the case in November 1966, on January 19, 1967,
the Illinois Supreme Court decided in a 3-2 decision 55 in favor of the
Lockport School Board. Justice Ray I. Klingbiel, for the majority, held
that the school need not "continue to employ one who publishes
misleading statements which are reasonably believed to be detrimental
to the schools. " 56 Yet, in a stinging dissent, Justice Walter V. Schaefer
found that "the State and Federal constitutions require a more precise
standard than 'the interests of the schools. "' 57 Justice Schaefer also took
the majority to task for deferring to the factfinding of the very Board that
fired Pickering and for not pointing to any evidence that Pickering knew
that any of the statements he made in his letter to the editor were false. 58
He concluded by stating that "[t]o be entitled to the protection of the first
amendment it is not necessary that the plaintiffs letter be a model of
literary style, good taste and sound judgment. In my view it is not, but
my view is irrelevant." 59 After his defeat at the Illinois high court,
Pickering filed a petition for ce1iiorari with the United States Supreme
Court. The Court granted certiorari, noting probable jurisdiction, on
November 6, 1967.

B. Pickering at the US. Supreme Court
Oral argument in the case took place on March 27, 1968. The oral
argument lasted for some forty-nine minutes. 60 John Ligtenberg, for
Pickering, framed the argument as a pure First Amendment question of
whether a public school teacher had the constitutional right to criticize
the School Board and its policies in the local press. In this regard, he

53. Court Upholds Board's Firing of Teacher, CHI. TR!B., Mar. 4, 1966, at Bll.
54. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. The Illinois Supreme Court nmmally has seven justices, but there were two
vacancies at the time of the Pickering case. Of the five justices who heard the case, the
W K U H H justices in the majority were Republicans, and the two dissenting justices were
Democrats. Pickering, supra note 39.
56. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
57. ld. at 7 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
58. I d. at 7-8.
59. I d. at 10.
60. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39.
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maintained that public employees had constitutional rights just like
ordinaJy citizens and h uld not have to forfeit them just because they
became government employee . Ligtenberg cited the recently decided
Ke ish ian v. Board of Regent loyally oath ca e for lhi propo ition. 61
He al o pointed out that even if ome of Pickering written tatements
were false, they nevertheless served the important fun Wion of helping
the public arrive at the truth of the matter.
John F. irri ione argued th ca e for the Lockport chool Board. His
argument like the Illinois upreme Colllt opinion, focu ed on the alleged
harm Pickering' tatement cau d to the uperintenclent, Board and
fellow teachers who supported the tax increase referenda. In essence,
CiUUicione maintained the essential falsity of Pickering's statements in
the letter, though he did not allege the statements were knowingly false.
He also contended that because Pickering was negligent in his allegations,
the school district had the ability to terminate him so that the efficiency
of its services to the public would not be undermined. This argument
gave little weight to Pickering and his First Amendment speech rights
and concentrated instead on the control that an employer should have
over an employee in such circumstances. 62
In an 8- 1 decision 63 written by Ju lice Thurgood Marshall, the Court
held WKDW Pickering had a Fir t Amendment right to free speech that
64
could not be forfeited to rvc the 'be t interests" of the school district.
Although Justice Marshall recognized that the government's relationship

61. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regent 385 U. . 5 9 (1967).
62. A number of the U. . Suprem ourt .JuS1i -es ccmed highly keptical during
oral argument that tJte medium of communication (oral versu ZULWWHQ or the audience
for the communication (leachet ver us the genera l public) hould make any difference
whatsoever. See Transcript f Oral Argument, supra note 39.
f cou e, Justice
Marshall' opinion for the majority in Pickering pecifically found that uch differences
in mode and manner of public employee speech did not warrant different legal tandards.
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.. 563, 574 ( 196 ).
63. Ju Lice White wrote an opinion that con urred in part and di ented in part.
Pickering 391 U.. at 82- 84 (White J . concuUUing in S art and GLV enting in part).
Alth ugh Ju Lice White agreed with the majority holding that Pickering had the right to
auth r the letter, h wrote n partial dissent to VD\ he di agreed that NQRZLQJO\ IDOVH
comments that cau ·e no KDUP hould al o be protected by the First Amendment. /d.
64. See id. at 565 567 (majority opinion); see alVR -XVWLFHV Extend Teachers Fr e
Speech Rights 1 .Y. T,MES June 4, 1968, at 24 ('Public hool teacher PD\ not be
discharged for good-faith criticism of school officials, even if some f the charge arc
false, the uprcm Court ruled today.").

921

to individuals was necessarily different in the employment context, 65 he
nevertheless finnly stated that public employees have constitutional
rights, including rights to free speech. 66
If public employees retain their First Amendment rights, the question
is then, How should the Court balance each of the parties' competing
interests? Justice Marshall described the appropriate balance this way:
The problem in any case is to DUULYH at a balance between the interests of the
[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.67

To be clear, the governmental interests recognized in Pickering are not
in any sense constitutional rights but rather are interests that government
employers have in maintaining "a significant degree of control over their
employees' words and actions" because "without it, there would be little
chance for the efficient provision of public services." 68 The balance
undertaken in Pickering is required because even though the government
employer perf01ms "important public functions" 69 and consequently
possesses far broader powers in its employer capacity tban in it sovereign
capacity0 "a citizen who works for the government i nonetbele a
citizen. Consequently, the First Amendment GRHV limit the DELOLW\ of
the public employer to condition employment of that employee on the
forfeiture of his or her constitutional rights under this doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. 72
Important considerations in carrying out the Pickering balance include
whether the public employee's speech impairs discipline by superiors,
harmony among coworkers, close working relationships for which
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or the performance of the
65. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general.").
66. Jd. at 565.
67. ld. at 568.
68. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006) (comparing to Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983), which found that "government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter").
69. Pickering 39 1 U.S. at 568.
70. GarcetWi, 547 U.S. at41 8 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 , 671 (1994)
(plurality opinion)}; see a/so ERW,N CHEMER,NSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND PoLl IES Ill 0 (3d ed. 2006) ("[S]peech by public employees is clearly less
protected than other speech.").
71. Garceui, 547 U.S . at 419.
72. See id. ( 'The FirsW Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to
leverage the employment relationshiJ to U H trict incidentally or intentionally, the libetties
employees enjoy in their capacities a private citizens." (citing PeUU\ v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 , 597 (1972))) .
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emp loyee dutie or the regular operation of the enterprise. 73 In
Pickering it elf, the balancing cam out in favor of Pickering because
(1) th tatements in the letter related to matter of public concernwhether the cbool sy tem required additional fXQd for tran portation
and other educational need  (2) no evidence exi ted that the statement
inte1fered with Pickering's job duties or with the operation of the school
in general and (3) he wa peaking in his capacity a a private citizen. 74
In uch in tance , Justice Mar hall concluded that 'it i nece sary to
regard [Pickering] as the member of th general public he seeks to be.'
Perhap equally important, the Co urt majority in Pickering al o noted
how critica l it wa to allow public employee , lik Pickering to speak
out on matters of public concern becau e uch employees are at many time
in the be t po ition to have "informed and definite opinion . '76 [n other
word , public employe help to en ure the transparency and accountability
frcpre entative, democratic government . Public employee wi ll peak
out on matter· of govemment abu VH waste or fraud , but only if they are
a XUHG that they do not ri k tho e very job every time they p ak.
Unfortunately more recent ca VH developments in e Pickering sugge l
that the upreme Court ha not focused enough on thi important a pect
of the Pickering decision. The initial unraveling of thi ·trongV tatement
of the uncon titutional conditions doctrine in the government-asemployment context finds its root in parallel developments in the
government-as-sovereign context.
IV. UNCONSTITUTJONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT
ACTS AS SOVEREIGN

Public employee free speech rights reached their zenith as a result of
the Pickering holding. Yet, the seeds of their destmction were already
being planted in the parallel context of the unconstitutional conditions
73. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.. 563, 569- 73 (1968).
74. See id. at 571-73. Here, it can hardly be doubted that expre ly signing the
leller "a a cilizen, taxpayer nnd voter, not as a teacher " see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
225 .E.2d  4 Ill. 1967) (emphasis added), immeasurably helped Pickering under the
tandard developed by the RXUW
75. Pickering 91 U. . at 574.
76. /d. at 572 ('Teacher are . .. members of a community most likely to have
LQIRUPHGand dcfinit opinions as to how fund allotted to the operations of the schools
hould be spent. Accordingly it i essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
question without fear of retaliatory di mi al.").
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doctrine when the government acts as a sovereign towards its citizen.
Importantly, in those cases, the penalty-subsidy debate among the
Justices shaped the modern contours of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. As will be illustrated, the holdings in the go vernment-assovereign cases have now slowly infiltrated into the government-asemployer context, primarily through the doctrinal innovation ofthe
government speech doctrine. After reviewing the government-as-sovereign
precedent, the Article will therefore discuss how the penalty-subsidy
jurisprudential divide has come to shape the Com1's modern treatment of
public employee speech law.

A. The Historical Foundations of the Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Conditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions existed in various forms
before Marvin Pickering's fateful showdown with the Lockport School
Board. Not only had the doctrine been applied the year before in a seminal
loyalty oath case involving a public university professor, Keyishian v.
Board of Regents7 but it has since been applied to a wide variety of
constitutional cases. These cases involved tax exemptions,78 users of
public facilities 9 and recipients of government subsidies. 80 In these
cases, the Court initially pushed back against government attempts to
condition receipt of government largesse based on forfeiture of citizens '
constitutional rights. 81
So where does the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions find its
judicial roots? Although not rooted in any single clause of the Constitution,
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a creature of judicial
implication.82 In its simplest terms, the doctrine prohibits the government

77. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regent , 385 U.S. 5 9, 609 ( 1967) tr iking down state
law prohibiting employment of pu blic school tea hers who advocate overthrowing U. .
gove rn ment a a YLRODWLRQof employeeV' rights to free assoc iation).
78. See, e.g., Spei er . Randall, 357 U.S. 5 13 (195 ).
79. See, e.g., Lamb s hapel v. tr. Morichc Un ion Free ch. Dist. 508 U.. 384
395- 96 (I 993) (ho ldi ng uncon Witutional a law that allowed the school district to deny
the church u e of its SUR pe1ty to how religious fil m ); Healy . James, 40 U.. 169,
187- 88 ( 1972) (holding that a state colleg campu may not, con i WHQW with the first
Amendment, deny recognition to a tu den t organization based on poli ti.ca l affiliatio n).
80. See, e.g. FC v. League of Women Voters, 46 U.. 364 ( I 984).
8 1. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Condition  State 3 R Z H U  and the
limits o/ Consent, 02 HARV. L. REv. 4, 7 ( 1988) (noting that the unconstitutional
conditions doctri ne " has EHGHYLOHGcourts and commentator alike").
82. !d. at 10-11.
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from onditi ning a beoefit based on forfeiture of an individual'
con titutional right. 83
The doctrine of uncon titutional condition fir t enjoy d widespread
u e in the early part of the twentieth centuty when the Lochner ourt84
initially developed conomic ubV tantive due proces .85 Under tbi form
of sub tantive due proce s the Lochner Court empha Vized property
rights and the freedom to contract. 86 But with the a cendancy of
Roo evelt
ew Deal ourt in the late 1930s and the ovemtling of
rnuch o[ the Lochner Court's ub tantive due proce jurisprudence in
the en uing period 87 the doctrine f uncon titutional condition went
through a. ubstantial period of disu e.
ub equ ntly, the Warren ourt renewed the uncon titutional
condition doctrine in a number of ca e involving ivil libertie . Many
of the ·e ca es invol ed the g vernment in it role a overeign, seek ing
to induce certai n preferred out ome through u e of government
ub idie and tax exemptions. ,Q the e ca e  the government ought to
83. Kathleen M. Sullivan 8QFRQVWLWXWLRQDO Conditions 102 HARV. L. R.EV . 1413,
141 , 1421 - 22 (1989) (''Uncon WLWXWLRQDO conditions problem ari e when government
offers D benefit on condition that the recipient pcrfonn or forego an activity thnt a
preferred con titutional right nonnally protect from government interference.").
84.
ee Lochner v. ew York, 198 U.. 45, 56- 57 (1905) (utili7Jng a ·ub tantive
analysis to trik down maximum hour law for bakers becau e of it
due proc
"arbitraUy interfer nee with the right of the individual to his personal liberty''). The
Lochner ourt con titutionalized prop rty right and the liberty to contract under a
WKHRU\ of economic ubstantive due process as a means to strike down much social
welfare legi ODW ion during the first part of rhe twentieth century. ee Michael J. Phillips,
The Slow Return ofEconomic ubstantive Due Process, 4 SYRA X E L. REV. 917,91920 ( 1999); see al o Gregory M. tein, Nuance and Complexiry in Regulatory Takings
/ D Z 15 WM .
MARY BILL RTS. J. 389 395 (2006) (noting that the Lo /mer Court
protected propet1y right at the ex pen ·e or popular government).
85. Economic ub tantivo due pr ces commonly refers to the con titutionali7.ation
of an economic lib rtarian judicial phi losophy through u e of the substantive component
of the Du Process ODuse of the FifWh and Fout1eenth Amendments. ee 3KLOOLS , supra
note 84, at 918 n.5, 91 - 20.
6. See id. at 919- 920. 7 K d ctrinc of uncon titutional condition can tcchniea!Jy
be found ILUVW in Doyle v. RQWLQHQWDO,QVXUDQFH Co., 94 U. . 535  76): "Though a
'tate may have the power, if it sees ILW to subject it citizens to the inconvenience of
prohibiting all foreign corporation from tran ·acting busines withi11 its juri diction1 it
ha no power to impose XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO conditions upon their doing so." /d. at 543
(Bradley, J., dissenting).
87. Indeed. Lochner it elf came into disfavor during thi time. See Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.. 5 9 597 (1977 ("The holding in Lochner has been implicitly rejected many
time ." citing Roe v. Wade. 410 U. . 113, 117 (1973); Gri wold v. Connecticut, 381
U.. 479, 4 1- 2 1965); Ferguson v. krupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963); )+$
Darlington Inc. 35 U.. 4, 91 - 92 (1959))).
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utilize its Spending Clause poweU8 to award government largesse to
individuals in return for these individuals' agreeing to conditions that
burdened their exercise of constitutional rights. 89 In such cases, the
question became, "[W]hen government conditions a benefit on the
recipient's waiver of a preferred liberty, should courts review the
conditioned benefit deferentially, as a benefit, or strictly, as a burden on
a prefened liberty?"90

B. The Penalty-Subsidy Debate
In answering this foundational question, a considerable amount of
dissonance has historically existed between two groups of Justices, and
indeed two different schools of jurisprudential thought have sprung up
concerning how to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Socalled liberal or progressive Justices construe the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine more expansively and generally find that conditions
placed on government benefits represent a penalty on the exercise of
individual rights protected by the Constitution. As such, these conditions
are subject to strict scrutiny and are usually found unconstitutional. 91 In
contrast, the subsidy group of conservative Justices narrowly construes
the doctrine and finds most government conditions to be mere "subsidies."
As such, these conditions are subjected to rational basis review and are
generally upheld as constitutional; although individuals have the right to
exercise their constitutional rights, they do not have a right to have those
rights subsidized. 92

1. Penalty Cases
The contours of the penalty-subsidy debate can first be seen in the
1958 case of Speiser v. Randall. 93 In that case, the Supreme Court held
that the State of California could not condition veteran tax exemptions
88. The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states, "The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S.
ONST. art. l § 8, cl. I .
89. Congress L allowed to provide incentives under its Spending Clause powers,
but it may not coerce federal IXQGLQJ recipients througb this power. See South Dakota v.
Dole, 4 3 U.S. 203, 210 (  87) (' [T]he [spending] power may not be used to induce the
tales to engage in activitic that would themselves be unconstitutional.") .
90. See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1415.
91. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,547-49 (2001); FCC
v. League of' Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,380,402 (1984).
92. See, e.g., RuVt v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991); Regan v. Taxation
withRepr sentation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977).
93. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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on individual declaring that they did not advocate the violent ovetihrow of
the government. 94 rn this regard Justice Brennan stated for the majority
that "[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain form
of peecb i in effect to penali ze them for uch peech. lt deterrent
effect is the arne as if the Stat were to fine them for thi speech. 95 Ln
the first hint of the debate to come Ju tice lark writing in di ·ent
nsc a
found that th tax exemption program for veteran wa in n
penalty and instead alifornia wa m rely "declining to xtend the
grac of the tate to app OOant ." 96
In an ther penalty ca e ver twenty-five year later the ourt truck
down a govemment sub. idy program in FCC v. L eague of Women
Voters of &DOLIRUQLD There plaintiff: challenged ection 39 of the
Corporation for Public Broadca ting Act,98 which conditioned publi
broadcasting ub idie based on nonconunercial educational broadcaster
agreeing not to editorialize. 99 Justice Brennan found that secti.on 399
violated the Fir t Amendment rights of broadca ter b cau e the law'
ban n editorializing far exceeded what wa neces ary to protect against
the ri k of governmental interference with th H political proce . 100 In
other w rds, Ju tice Brennan applied a trict level of scruliny to thi law
becau e it burdened the First Amendment rights of broad a ter . 101
Although the government may have had a vital interest in regulati ng
94. /d. at 51 . In Speiser alLfornia sought to have all veteran eeking a c rtain
tax exemption sign a declaration that they did not advocate the overthrow of the United
rates by force or violence or other unlawful mean . ld at 515.
95. ld. at 518.
96. Id at 541 ( lark J., dis enting). Thi idea of declining to extend legisODtive
"grace" has been recently repeated by hicf Ju. tice Robert in Engq uist v. Oregon
Department of $JULFXOWXUH 553 U. . 591, 607 (2008): "(A) government dcci ion to
limit the abi lity of public employers to fire at will i an act of legi lative grace, not
con tit\Jtional mandate."
97. F
v. League of Women Voters 46 U.. 364 ( 1984).
98. /d. at 366; see 47 U.. ·. § 399 (2006).
99. League of Women Voters, 468 .. at 366.
00. Jd at 395. Then-Ju tice Rehnquist for hi part, di sen ted in League of Women
Voters ba cd on his belief that the Vame analysis utilized in Regan v. Taxation ZLWK
Repre. Ventation, ·ee di cu sion infra Part 1V.B.2 should have appli d. / H D J X H of Wom en
Voters, 468 U.. at 40 (Rehnqu ist, J. di senting). pecifically, he argued that both
ca
involved government allocation of public moneys as it desired and that ueh
allocati n hould not be disturbed if the government is able to h w thaW the ub. idy is
rationally related to it govemmental purpo c. !d. at 407.
l 0  L Hague of Women Voters, 46 U.. nt 3 5 (majority opinion) arguing that th
govemment regulation was overbroad and not crafted with ufficient precision to remedy
the danger that the government ought to addrcs ).
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public broadcasters, Justice Brennan was unconvinced that the means by
which the govemment attempted to accomplish its aims were narrowly
tailored. 102
More recently, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, Justice Kennedy
found that the federal law in question unreasonably interfered with the
First Amendment rights of lawyers participating under the Legal Service
Corporation (LSC) program. 103 Under that program, LSC attomeys
could be prohibited from being involved in litigation challenging the
validity of existing welfare laws for constitutional or statutory reasons
when representing an indigent plaintiff in a welfare dispute.104 Specifically,
Justice Kennedy found that govemment "may not design a subsidy to
effect this serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of attomeys
and the functioning of the judiciary." 105 The government subsidy, in
short, had crossed the line from a mere subsidy to an unconstitutional
condition that coerced individuals in the exercise of their First Amendment
rights. 106
2. Subsidy Cases

Although subsidy arguments can be viewed in cases as early as
Speiser, 107 the rise of the subsidy argument appears to mostly coincide
with the rise of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts and their conservative
judicial philosophy. For example, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation

102. !d.
103. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,549 (2001).
I 04. See id. at 537-38 .
105. !d. at 544.
06. See id. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Scalia, found that the
program was merely a subsidy and did not interfere with the indigent plaintiffs right to
bring a welfare claim. See id. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) . In this regard, Justice
Scalia stated that "[t]he [LSC] provision simply declines to subsidize a certain class of
litigation, and ... that decision 'does not infringe the right' to bring such litigation." !d.
at 553-54 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)). Although Justice
Kennedy, for the majority, was concerned with the practical effect of having an LSC
attorney withdraw in the middle of the case, Justice Scalia cursorily responded, "No
litigant who, in the absence of LSC funding, would bring a suit challenging existing
welfare law is deteUUed from doing so by [the LSC provision in controversy]." !d. at 554.
And even if they were, Justice Scalia reasoned, "So what? The same result would ensue
from excluding LSC-funded lawyers from welfare litigation entirely." !d. at 556. It
appears that Justice Scalia is arguing here that the greater right to completely not fund
welfare litigation necessarily includes the lesser right to prohibit certain types of welfare
litigation. Such reasoning, however, has been persuasively rejected in modern
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence on a number of grounds . See Betman, supra
note 17, at 18-19 (describing the various rejoinders to the greater-includes-the-lesser
argument).
107. See supra notes 93- 96 and accompanying text.
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of Wa hington  the our! upheld a federal tax law SURYLVLRQ that
conditioned tax exempt tatu under Ol( c) 3) of the Jntemal Revenue
ode 109 on recipients not 1 articipating in lobbying or patti an political
110
activitie .
Thcn-Ju tice Rehnqui st, writing for the majority, made a
distinction between whether an organization i permitted to lobby as a
result of a law, as opposed to whether Congres i required to pro ide
W K organization with public money with which to I bby.11 Wherea the
former involve tbe doctrine of uncon titutional conditions Rehnqui t
maintained W K H latter fall into a broad category f case that Vtand for
the proposition that "a legi lature's dcci ion not to subsidize the exerci e
of a fundamental right doe not infiingc the right."12 As Rehnqui t later
expl a ined in hi di sent in League of Women Voters, [W]hen th
Government i imply exerci ing it power to aJlocate it own public
fund [the Court] need only find that the condition imposed has a
rational relation hip to Congres V purpose in providing the ub i ly and
that it is not primarily aimed at th uppre ion of dangerou idea  

Finding such a rational relation hip and the lack of an intention to uppres
dangerou idea the majority in Regan upheld the ,5&
di pute. 11 4
Subsidy ca e after Regan have failed to hed much OLJKW on how thi s
important di tinction between a p natty and a subsidy can be made in an
objective, con i tenl manner. For insta nce in lhe abortion-funding ca H
of Rust v. Sullivan 115 recipients of Title X family plannjng fund . 116 were
108.
109.

Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
26 U.S.C. § 50l(c)(3) (Supp. V 1982).
llO. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 551.
Ill. /d.
112. }d. at 549 · see also Cammarano v. Uni ted tates 35 U .. 49 515 (1959)
(uphold ing a Treasury regu1ati n that denied bu ' iness cxpcn e deduction for 1 bbying
activiti and rejecting the "notion th at First Amendment right arc omeh w n t fully
realized unless they are subs idized by the StaWe"). For a recent examp le of thi ubsidy
principle, see genera ll y Locke v. Davey, 540 U. . 7 12 (-004). in which the ourt refuses
WR force a tate to subsidize an individual . right of free cxerci e of religion in the higher
education context .
v. League of Women Voter, 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984) (Relmquist, J.,
113. F
di enting) (quoting Cammarano, 5 U. . at 513).
114. Regan 46 1 U. . at 550- 51.
11 5. Rust v. Sulliva n, 500 U.. 173 ( 1991. . Rust was, at the time, the late VW in a
long line of abortion-funding D es that had been simi larly charac terized as subsidy cases
by the Court. The c ca c pennincd variou rc triction on a woman' · abi lity to chao c
to Icnninatc her pregnancy. See Web. ter v. Rcprod . Health ervs. 492 U. . 490, 509
( 19 9) (finding con titutional a WDWXWRU\ ban on use of public employees and facilitie
for performance or as istance of nontheUDpHXWic aborti ns); +DUULs v. McRae 44 U..
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prohibited by new Health and Human Services regulations fi:om engaging in
abortion coun eting, referral and activities advocating abmtion as a method
of I D P L O \ planning. 117
hief Ju tice Rehnquist, analogizing Rust to
Regan 1 8 a s rted that what was at stake was only the subsidization
of fundamental right - fTee peech rights and substantive due process
tights-and not the denial of these same fundamental rights. 119 In this
regard, he maintained that "Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling
and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if
the Government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at
all." 12 Consequently, he applied rational review and found that the
government's subsidization practices in this area were rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest and not related to the suppression
of a dangerous idea, namely, the promotion of the welfare of the mother
and the unborn child. 121
In a later unconstitutional conditions case, the subsidy group of
Justices could only muster a plurality. In United States v. American

297 315- 17 ( 1980) (upholding governm ntal regulations withholding public funds for

nontheropcutic abortion but allowing payments IRU medical services related to childbirth);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 478- 0 (1977) (same).
116. See 42 U. . . §§ 300-OOa-6 (2006). Section I00 of the Public Health
ervice Act prohibits IXQGLQJ recipients from u ing tho e funds LIDERUWLRQ i a potential
famLly planning altemativc. See id. § 300a-6.
117. See Rust 500 U. . at 178, I 0.
118. See id. at 194, 197- 9 .
119. !d. at 193 ("[T]he Government ba not di riminated on the basis of viewpoint;
it has merely chosen Wo fund one acti vity t the exclusion of WK other. ')· ·ee also id. at
192- 93 ("[G]ovemment may make a Yalue judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,
and . .. implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.'" (quoting Maher
432 U.. at 474)); id. at 196 ("[TiWle X UHJXODWLRQV@ simply in ist[ed] thai public funds be
pent for the SXUSRVH for which they were authorized.").
120. ld. at 202.
121.
ee id. at l93 . Justice Blackrnun, on the other band, wrote in hi di ent WKDW
the law in question based the granting of governmental larges e on U1c condition that
doctorVand other fam ily planning funding recipient give up their right to free speech
under the Fir L Amendment. See ;d. at 207 (Bia.ckmun, J., di enting) ("Whatever may
be the Government ' s power to condition the receipt of its larges upon th
UHOLQTXLVKPHQW of con titutionaJ rights, il surely doc not extend to a condition that
VXSSUHV es the recipient's cherished freedom of speech ba ed solely upon the content or
viewpoint of WKDW speech."). Moreover he argued that HQVXULQJ that federal fund are
nol spent I R U a purpose outside the c pc of W K H S U R J U D P . . . falls far hort of that
ncce sary to justify !he VXSSUHVVLRQ of truthIXO infonnation and professional medical
opinion regarding consti tutionally protected conduct.' Id at 2 14. He also noted that the
regulation detrimentally impacted the fifth Amendment rights of pregnant women ro
choose whether R U not to have a child . See id. at 216 (''By suppres iug medically
pertinent information and injecting a re trictive ideological message unrelated to
considerations of maternal health the Government places formidable obstacle in the
path of Title X clients' freedom of FKRLFH and thereby violate their )LIWK Amendment
rights.").

930

(VOL. 48: 907, 2011)

Neoformalism
SAN D IEGO LAW REVIEW

Library Ass 'n, 122 the dispute involved whether the Children Internet
Protection Act (CIPA) 123 provision that provided a federal subsidy for
publi libraries t in tall littering software on their web-accessible
computet wa an unconstitutional condition. 124 Here, the plurality found
the provision to be a mere ub idy, finding that "the use of filtering software
help to carry out these program , [and therefore] it is permissible under
Ru W  ' 125 Both di ents found the Cl.PA provision in question to impose
an uncon titulional co11dition witb Justice Stevens writing that the
pro i ion ' impermi sibly conditions the receipt of Government funding
on the rcst:ri tion of ignificant irst Amendment right . 126
More recently the ourt decided the Fir t Amendment ca e of
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acaderni and In WLWXWLRQDORightV, Inc. (FAIR) .121
FAIR concerned the enactment of the olom n Amendment by ongres ,
which prevent colleg s and universities from receiving ce1tain federal
Iunding12 if they prohibit military recruiters "fUom gaining access to
to student . . . on campuses, for purposes of
campuse , r acce
military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope
122. United tate v. Am. Libra1y
V n, 53 U.. 194 (2003).
hi f Ju lice
Rehnqui W ZU te WKhe pl umlity decision in thi ub Vidy case and wa joined by ub idy
Ju W L F H V ' onnor, Scalia. and 7KRPDV /d.
12 .
'hildrcn's lnrcmet Protection Ael, Pub. L. o. 106-554. 114 tat. 276 A-335
(2000). onecrning .,3$ Professor De DL ha observed:
Rather than impo ing a broud prohibition on the material that
ngrHs
FonV idcrcd inappropriate, ,PA requires public libraries and publi cho OV a
a condition or receiving FHUWDLQ IHGHUDO benefit , to use 'lecbnological protection
measure ' (for ex. mple, filtering oftware) to SUHYHQW library SDWURQ and
Sublic schoc>l tudent from accessing objectionable exuall y c. pliclt material
over the lntcmct.
Anuj C. Desai, FilterV and Federalism: Public Library Intern et Access, Local Control,
and the Federal S H Q G L Q J Power, 7 U. PA. J. Co ST. L. 1, 3 (2004).
124. Am. / L E U D U \ Ass 'n, 539 U.S. at 210- 13.
125. ld. at212.
126. /d. at 225 Steven J., di senting); see alVR id. ai 23 1 (Souter, J., dissenting
>7@KH blocking requi rements RI> &IPA) ... impose an uncon tiWutional eondi1ion on the
Government' subsidies to ORFDO OLEUDULH for providing access to W K H Internet. . The
dis. ent rs believed thRt the fi ltering VRIWZ arc would inevitably block protected First
Amendment speech either th rough underblock ing or overblocking of web sites. /d. at
22 1- 22 ( tevcns J. dis nting); see id at 233- 4 ( outer, J   dis Venting).
127. Ru m fcld v. Forum for endemic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FA IR), 547
u.. 47 (2006).
12 . /d. at 51. A OWthough tud QW financial assistance i · not co red by th law,
federal funding from the Departments of Defense, Homeland ccu rity Tr:msportation,
Labor, llea lth and Human ervice and Education, among other agencic may be lost at
tJ1e uuiver ity-widc level if sch OV do not c mply with the Solomon Amendment. ee
10 . . . § 983(d (2006) .
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to the acce to campuses and to student that is provided to any other
employer." 129 A number of law chool believed that the olomon
Amendment required them to choose between abandoning their policie
again t exual rientation di crimination or lo ing a VXbstantial amount
of federa l funding. 130 This tb y argu d infringed on their i.rst
$PHQGP nt right of peecb and as ociation. 131
Although WKH Third Circuit Court f Appeal truck down the Solomon
mendmHnt, holding, inter alia that it ignificantly interfered with the
First Amendment expressive as ociation right of the law school in
question and therefore imposed an uncon. titutional condiLion 112 the
Supreme Court reversed. 13 The ourt avoided the uncon titutional
condition que tion altogeth r by deciding that the expressiv rights of
th law school were minimally burdened by the pre ence of military
recruiter on campus. 134 The ourt concluded WKDW a IXQGLQJ condjtion is
not unconstitutional if il can be con titutionally impo ed directly 135 and
determined that imposing the access requirement would not violate the
law schools' First Amendment rights to free speech or association. 136 It
may be that because the FXUUHQWgroup of Justices is no longer able to
agree on a basis on which to label unconstitutional conditions cases as
subsidy or penalty cases, they are simply choosing to avoid the issue
altogether whenever possible.
C. The Penalty-Subsidy Schools at Loggerheads

All in all, when the government act in it sovereign capacity,
applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions remains fraught with
uncertainties and it appea1 that there is no end in sight to tb F X U U nt
doctrinal stalemate. Even though the two ide in thi jurisprudential
struggle agree that government may unequaUy ub idize the exerci e of
a constitutional right and may not condition a benefit on the denial of a
constitutional right 137 that appears to be where the agreement end . ln
129. 10 u.s.c. § 983(b) (2006).
130. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 53.
131. Jd.
132. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d
219,243 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 47.
133. FAIR, 547 U.S . at 70.
134. !d. at 69-70.
135. !d. at 59- 60 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S . 513, 526 (1958)).
136. Jd. at 70.
137. See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 79 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (' [T]he law normally give legislatures broad authority to decide how to
spend the People' money. A legislature, after all, generally has the right not to fund
activities that it woXld prefe.r not to f1md-even where the activities arc otherwise
protected.'' (citing Regan . Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 ( 1983)))·
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deciding what a penally ase is and what a subsidy case is, the
disagreement eems to revolve around whether government ubsidization of
certain "alteUQative activity deemed in tb public intere t" 13 is tantamount
to "coercive interference" by the go ernment with an individual 's
constitutional rights. 13 9 Or perhaps put more simply, there is a c rtain lin
beyond which government ub idy of an alternative activity becomes
nothing OHs than the govemment' acting in an intimidating manner to
interfere with th con titutiona l rights of its citizens.
The abortion-funding ca e are typical of how the line drawing works
ub idy Justices- labeled
in these cases. 14 For example, the majority
the state and federal laws mere ub idjza tion because they did not
believe the subsidization of an alternative activity- in those cases, the
promotion f child birlh over abortion-significantly impinged on the
right of pregnant women t choo e to DERUW their pregnancies. 141 This
tance appear to derive from th belief that differential subsidization is
permis ible a long a a formal opportunity to exercise constitutional
rights exi ts out ide the program in another forum. 142 Such a neoformalistic
approach thu first b came apparent dealing with unconstitutional conditions
in government-as-sovereign cases.

°

see also Lyng v. Auto. Worker , 485 U. . 360, 36 ( 198 ) (holding that the federal

govemmcnt s refusal to provide fo d stamp benefits to strik ing worker was ju tificd
becau c 'strikers' right of DVsociation does not require the Government to fumi h funds
to maximize the exer ise of that Uight").
13 .
ee Harri v. McRae,44 U.. 297.3 15( 1980).
ee id at 327- 2 (White, J. concurring)· ·ee also ullivan supra note 83, at
139.
143 (noting that coercion has been invoked D V a justification Ior .. trik[i ng] down
condition that affect righ t lo freedom of pcech, religion and a ciation, but without a
(maintain ing that labeling a ca c
consi tent r satisfyi ng the ry''). % X W see id. at 1505
as an uncon tilutional conditions one ba ·ed n concerns of coercion i really just a
"conclu ory label ma qucrading a ana lysis").
140. 'ee, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. '. 173 (19 ); Webster v. Rcprod. Health
ervs., 492 U.S. 490 (19 9); Harris. 44 U.. 297· Maher . Roc, 432 U.. 4 4 1977.
141. See, e.g., Harris, 448 . . at 315- 16 (">,]t simply d cs n W follow that a
woman's freedom of choice caUUieV with it a con titulional entit lement to the .financial
re VourcHs t avail herself of the full range of protected choice .").
142.
ee RuV1, 500 . . at 19 ("By requiring that the Title X gran tee engage in
abortion-related activity separately fr m activity rccci ing fed UDO funding. ongre s
ha . con i tent with our teachings in League Rf Women Voters and Regan, not denied it
the right to engage in abortion-related acti itics. ongrc.ss has merely rcfu ed to fund
such aclivitic ut of the public ILVc, an G the cretary bas imply required a certain
degree of eparation from the Title X project in order to en ure the integrity of the
federal ly fund d program.").
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Conversely, the dissenting penalty Justices in these same cases believe
just as strongly that such subsidization significantly coerces doctors in
their free speech rights when counseling pregnant women and also
coerces these same women in their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in deciding whether to carry a pregnancy to tenn. 143 As an example,
Justice Blackmun in the Rust case found the majority's conclusion
"insensitive and contrary to common human experience, [as b ]oth the
purpose and result of the challenged regulations are to deny women the
ability voluntarily to decide their procreative destiny." 144 This point of
view derives from these penalty Justices' firmly held belief that a fonnal
analysis under these circumstances is insufficient and that social justice
instead requires a more practical analysis of the impact of such cases. 145
Such an approach requires nothing less than considering how the
outcome of the case will actually affect the parties. 146
In short, it might be said without exaggeration that the quagmire in
which the Court finds itself in these unconstitutional conditions cases
where government acts in its sovereign capacity is as fundamental as the
distinction between legal formalism and legal realism. 147 Yet, as discussed
143. See, e.g., id (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("By suppressing medically pertinent
infmmation and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to considerations of
maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the path of Title X
clients' freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment rights.").
144. !d. at 217. Justice Blackmun would instead have applied a more searching
IRUP of scrutiny and, at the very least, balanced the govenunent's interests in promoting
a certain type of family platming against the First Amendment rights of doctors and the
Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights of pregnant women. See id. at 213-14.
145. In other words, the penalty Justices would argue that it is necessDUy to
practically consider the impact that the nonsubsidization will have on individuals whose
constitutional rights may be impacted. This line of reasoning resonates with the FXUUHQW
political debate between President Obama and his detractors over the need for a Supreme
Court Justice to have empathy and to understand the real world implications of his or her
decisions. See, e.g. , Janet Hook & Christi Parsons, Obama Says Empathy Key to Court
Pick, L.A. TIMEs, May 2, 2009, at AI ("President Obama, who will choose the nominee,
focused not on volatile ideological questions but on personal character, saying he wanted
someone with 'empathy' for 'people's hopes and struggles."').
146. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROW,NG THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 144 (2002) ("For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it
appears to proceed in these [federalism] cases with an agenda, the facts are of minor
importance and the persons affected are wmtby of ahnost no attention. . . . The people
and their problems that have been grist for the constitutional mill are incidental."); see
also Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1497-98 (arguing for a "systemic" approach to
unconstitutional conditions, which, among other things, "recognizes that background
inequalities of wealth and resources necessarily determine one's bargaining position in
relation to government, and that the poor may have nothing to trade but their liberties").
Justice Rehnquist clearly does not agree with Sullivan's and her legal realist compatriots'
approach because in deciding Rust-for which Sullivan was on brief for petitioners- he
sided with respondents and characterized the case, yet again, as a subsidy case.
147. Although legal fonnalism and legal realism are capable of many different
meanings, Judge Posner offers some helpful insights in this regard. He defines legal
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above, tbe practical or Tealist approach adopted by the penalty Ju tice i
more of a respon e to an emerging neofR rmali m in which the ub idy
group pays in ufficient attention t the real world consequence of it
decisions. And a the id s continue to talk pa t one another the gap in
under tanding how to con i tently apply the doctrine f uncon titutional
onditions in the government-a - ov reign context persi t .4
But this neoformaJist-pragmati t divide in unconstitutional condition
ca es i not limited to the government-as- overeign context. ince the
Co urt deci ion in Pickering the ame divide ha anim ated tbe
unconstitutiona.l condition analysi in the public employment context.
A demon trated in Part V the subsidy Justice have al o emerged
vi torious in their judicial battle with the penalty Ju tice in a HV in
which government a t in its employer capacity. But in thi area, the u e
of the government speech doctrine ha done a substantial amount of the
heavy analytical lifting fo r the ub icly Ju tice .

V. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT
ACTS AS AN EMPLOYER

In ome way th development of the do trine of un on titutional
condition in employment has para lleled its development in the ub idy
context. For example ju t a the United tate upreme ourt n e held
that govemment benefits were m r privil.ege that could be withhe ld or
limi ted on any condition 149 Ju tice Oliver W ndell Holme on c famou Jy
said that in the employment context a per on "may have a con titutional

formalism a HQDEO>LQJ@ a commentator to pronow1cc the outcome of the case a. being
correct or incorrect. in approximately the am way that WKH olution to o mathematical
problem can be pron unced D V correct incon'Ccl. Ricbard A. P snor, Legal Formalism,
Legal Realism, and the lnte11Jretation of Statutes and the &RQVWLWXWLRQ 37 CA 6(W. 5 H V 
L. REv. 179,  (19 6). Legal rcaJism, in contrast is de(jned as "deciding a ca VH o that
its outcome best promotes Sublic welfare in nonlegalistic terms it is policy analysis.'
!d. lntcrc tingly, Judge Posner G R H V not believe fonnali. m or realism hould be utilized
when interpreting statut or constitutional provision but only in developing W K H
common law. See id.
14 . See generally Barbara A. anch z  ote, United tatcs . Ameri an Library
Association: The Choice %HWZHHQ Cash and RQVWLWXWLRQDO Rights, 3 AKRON . REV.
463, 492- 93 (2005) discu ing th continuing chasm of view on th proper application
of the X Q on titutional conditions doctrine in American Library Association).
149.
ee, e.g., People v. ranH, 108 .E. 427 429- 30 (N.Y. 1915), ojJ'd, 239 U..
19 ( 1  (limiting public employment WR citizens on the theory that "[w]hatever is a
privilege UDWKHUthan a right may be made dependent on citi zenship").
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right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 150
But just as Supreme Comi precedent has sought to establish the end of
the right-privilege distinction when the government acts in the sovereign
capacity, 151 the Court, at least initially, arrived at this same conclusion in
the government-as-employer context as wel1. 152 For instance, in the
landmark public employment case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the
Supreme Comi stated emphatically: "[T]he WKHRU\ that public employment
which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." 153
Thus, as in the sovereignty context, the government "may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that LQIULQJHV his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech." 154 The same
reasoning that applied to the govemment-as-sovereign cases also applies
here: "For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of
his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited" 155 and "produce
a result which [it] could not command directly." 156 Yet, important
distinctions do remain when the government acts as an employer as
150. See McAuliffe v. Mayor ofNew Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see
also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (finding "no constitutional
infiUPity" to a law that required public employees to declare past and present Communist
affiliation).
151. See SugaUman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973) ("[T]his Court now has
rejected the concept that constitutional rights tum upon whether a govemmental benefit
is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege."' (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365,374 (1971))).
152. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) ("[C]onstitutional
doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its major premise. That premise
was that public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon
the suUUender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct govemment
action.").
153. See id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239
(2d Cir. 1965)) (intemal quotation marks omitted); see also 3HUU\ v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For at least a quarter-centuty, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable govemmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons
upon which govemment may not rely.')· herbert v. Verner, 374 U.S . 398, 404 (1963)
(stating that in the unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion context,
"[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege") .
154. See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597.
155. !d.
156. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11
(1972) ("[C]onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of
governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights."); Mazzone, supra note 3, at 806 ('The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions rejects the notion that the govemment's power to grant a benefit includes the
lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that benefit.").
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opposed to when it acts in its sovereign capacity. As already discussed,
Justice Marshall emphatically stated in Pickering that "it cannot be
gain aid that the State ha interests as an employer in regulating the
peech of it empl.oyee that differ VignifLcantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the ·peech of the citizenry in general." 157
Although Ju tice Marsha ll in Pickering did not cite to any precedent to
upport hi a sertion about the uniquene of the government in its
empl.oyer capacity, the upreme ourt on numerous occasions since has
affirmed lh i view of the va rying degrees of power that government bas
depending upon which hat it is wearing. 158 )or examp le in her opinion
for the Court in Board of County Commis ioners v. Umbehr 159 Ju tice
O'Connor explained that a governm nt employee s clo e relation hip
with the government requiJe a balancing of important fre Vpeech and
government interest . 160 In such relation VhipV , "[t]Kc government needs
to be free to term inate both emp loyees and contractors fo r poor
perfonnance, to improve the efficiency efficacy and re ponsiveness of
service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of FRUUXSWL n." 161 In
157.

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 568 (1968 (empha ·i added)· see

supra notes 6 - 67 and accompanying text.

15 .
ee Wate1 v. hurchill 511 6 661 671 - 72 (1994} (plurality opinion) ("We
have never explicitly answered thi question (about the goveUQPent's dual roles], though
we have alway a umed that its premise is orrect- lhat the g vernmcnt as employer
indeed ha far broader power than do Vthe govcmment D V overHign." (citing Pickering
391 U.S. at 568  Bd. of due. v. Grumet, 5 12 U 6 7 71 (1994) ( ' onnor, J.,
concurring) 'We have ... no one Free peech Oau VH test. We have different test for
c ntent-ba cd speech re trictions, for content-neutral speech re triction for rcs1rictions
imposed by the government acting as employer, for re trictions in nonpublic fora, and
on .")· onnick v. Myers 461 U.. 138, 147 (19 3); U.S. ivil crv. omm'n v. 1 at'l
Ass'n of Letter arriHrs, 413 U.S. 548, 5 4 (1973)· see al o Eugene Volokh, A RPPRQLaw Model for Religiou ( [ H P S W L R Q V  46
LA L. R ( . 1465 1497 ( 1999)
("Admini trative efficiency is genera lly not considered a ompelling interest under strict
crutiny, which may be one reason WKDW free speech ca es have ext licitly ad ptcd D more
deferential tandard for government-as-employer regulations instead of purporting to
apply trict crutiny." (citation omitted .
159. Bd. of nty. omm 'r . Umbchr,  U.S. 668 1996).
160. ld. at6 0.
161. ld. at 674; . ee also WaWers, 51  . . at 674-75 ("[T]he extra power the
government has in this area comes from the nature of the govcmment' mission as
employer.
overnment agencies are charged by Jaw with doing SDUWLFXODU ta k .
Agencie hire emp loyees to help d tho e task D V effectively and efficiently as pos VLEOH
When RPHRQH who is paid a salary o that he will contribute to the agency' effective
operation begin to do or ay things that detract from the agency's effective operation,
the govemment empl yer rnu W have omc power t rc train her.')· see also Mark
Tu hnet, The Possibilities ofComparaWive ConstituWLRQDO/DZ, 0 YAL L.J. 1225 1250
(1999) ("Th government has in trumental or programmatic goal within the domain of
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a similar vein, Justice Powell explained in his concuUUing RSLQLRQ in
Arnett v. Kennedy that "the Govemment's interest ... is the maintenance
of employee efficiency and discipline .... To this end, the Govemment,
as an employer mu t have wide discretion and control over the
162
Lastly, in her
management of it per onoel and intemal affairs."
plurality decision in Waters v. Churchill Justice 0 onnor juxtaposed
the two roles that government plays by desc ribing certain First
Amendment doctrines that cou.ld not be reasonably applied to speech of
govemrneot employees 163 and by outlining the le s stringent procedXUal
.
fi restnchon
. .
reqlllrements
Ior
on government emp Joyees , speech .!64
But although it is generally agreed that the government has more
power to interfere with con titutional rights in its employment
capacity, 165 it is far from clear how to assess which employment practices
are permissible and which are not. 166 In any event, the Court on numerous
occasions ince Pickering ba reaffim1ed this view of the government's
greater latitude when conditioning public employee rights in the
workplace. 167

PDQDJHPHQW When acting there, it may restrict individual autonomy in the service of it
programmatic goals." footnote omitted) (citing . Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and
Free Speech, 33 HARV. .R.- .L. L. REv. 1 L6-21 (1998))). lndeed, ab.ent contrDctual,
tatutRUy, or con litutional restriction, the government is entitled to terminate employe
and contractor R Q an at-will ba i , for good rca on bad reason, or no reason at all. See
Umbehr, 518 U.S. a W 674.
162. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Lf it
were otherwise, Ju tice PowelJ explain , the government employer would not be able to
remove inefficient and XQVDWLVIDFWRU\ workers quickly, and the goverrunent's ub tamial
interest in so doing would be fru trated without adequate j ustification. /d.
16 . See Water , 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number of )irst
Amendment doctriJle , such as obscenity, that do not app ly with the ame force in the
government-as-employer context, and stating that the employer ' may bar its employee
from using Mr. Cohen' offensive utterance to members of the publi or to the people
with whom ihey work" (citing Coltcn v. California 403 U. . 15, 2 25 (1971))).
164. See id. at 673 (observing that although speech UHV trictions on private citizens
must precisely defi11e the speecJJ they target a government employer i permitted to
prohibit it employees from acting "rude to customers' even though this re triclion
would be void for agueness under traditional First Amendment juri prudence).
165. 'ee id. (observing U1at the Court has "consistently given greater deference to
government prediction of harn1 used to justify UHVWULFWLRQ of employee pcccb than to
predictions ofhann used to ju tify re trictions on the speech of the pllblic DWODUJH).
166. See ConnLck v. Myers, 461 U.S. 13  150 (1983) (noting the difficulty
associated with the Pickering balancing) Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and injunctions in ,QWHOOHFWXDO Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 204 ( 1998)
('The Court bas acknowledged that sucb SDUWLFXODUL]HG balancing is difficult, and this
seems to be D Q understatement. From all we' ve seen of the lower court decision , th
WHVW i essentially indetetminate in all but th easiest cases." (footnote omitted) (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 150)).
167. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U. . at 671- 72 (plurality opinion) ("We have never
explicitly answered this question '[about the government ' dual roles], tbough we have
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A. The Dwindling First Amendment Speech Rights of
Public Employees Past-Pickering
Although Pickering came out in favor of Marvin Pickering, the
development of the doctrine since then has been generally one of limiting
the scope of the balancing test set forth therein. Initially, the Court
continued to protect public employee rights through the Pickering
constitutional balance. For instance, public employee free peech ca es
po t-Pickering have established that the Fir t mendment protects
government worker from being terminated for privately criticizing their
employer polici 168 for publicly expressing dislike for prominent
political figures 169 and even wb n those workers are independent contractors
for the go ernment employer. 170
Yet not too long after public employee free speech protection reached
its apex in Pickering, a new group of Justices began to whittle away
these protection . Fir W  th Court in Mount Healthy Board of Education v.
Doyle made it easier for employer to defend against these First
Amendment claim . 171 Under the Mount Healthy framework even if a
public employee can show that an employer's adve1 e employment action
was motivated by the employee's prate ted speech Ju tice Rehnquist
developed the "same deci ion" test to protect public employers from
liabi lity in a ubcategory of ca e . Under the same decision te t if the
employer can prove that it would have made the same decision regarding
the employee in the absence or the protected peech, it may e cape
liability. 172 Ju ·tice Rehnquist wrote in this regard: ' The con titutiona1
principle at take is ufficiently indicated if uch an employee is placed
in no wor capo ition than if he had not engaged in the conduct.' 173
Next, the Comi decided the "public concern' test of Connick v.
Myers. 174 Recall that in Pickering, Justice Marshall set up the balancing
test this way:

alway assumed that its premise i correct-that lhe governmem s employer indeed ha
IDU broader powers that docs the government a sovereign.").
16 .
ee, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line onsol. ch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 414-16 (1979).
169.
ee, e.g. Rankin v. McPh rson 48 U.. 378, 86 (19 7).
170.
ee, e.g., Bd. of nty. Comm rs v. Umbehr, 51 U. . 66 , 673 (1996).
171 . ML Healthy ity ch. Dist. Bd. of (GXFv. 'R yle, 429 U. . 274, 286 ( 1977).
172.
173.
174.

Jd. at 285- 86.
Jd.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
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The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the inter st of the
[public employee), as a itizen in commenting upon PDWWHUV ofpublic concem
and the inl'ere. t of ihe WDWH as an employer, in SURPRWLQJ the efficiency of the
public services it perfot1ll through it. Hmployees.l75

Justice White, the partial di enter in Pickering and now writing for the
majority in Connick, utilized th LWDOicized language above from
Pickering to require that the public employee first show that he or she
spoke on a matter of public concem before getting the benefit of the
Pickering balance. 176 The &RXUWadopted this new requirement ba ed on
the common- en e realization that government offices could not fun FWLRQ if
117
eveUy employment deci ion became a constitutional matter.
Gojng
forward , public mployee speech characterized as being a matter of
SULYDWH interest," Like a per onnel dispute would no longer receive the
protection of lhe First Amendment. 178
The coup de grace DJDLQV t Pickering however, wa recently delivered
by the Roberts Cowt in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 179 In Garcetti, a deputy
di trict attomey for Los Angeles County Richard Ceballo , wa ubje ted
to advcr e employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly
defective earch warrant in a ciiminal case. 180 Although th Garcetti
Colll't paid l·ip HUYLFH to its commitment to the doctrine of unconstitutional
condition in public employment,t 81 Ju tice Kennedy for the 5----4 majority
nonetheless held that if employees are engaged in peech pursuanl to
their official duties at work, they are not p aking a 'citizen ' and thus
enjoy no Fir t Amendment protection for their peech. 182 Because
Ceballos wa engaged in speech pursuant to his job duties, he was not
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concem but only a a
government employee. A uch the ourt concluded that eballo did
175. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968) (emphasis added).
176. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41 , 143.
177. Jd. at 143.
much m re
178. To be fair though, the hl1Id1e imposed by Connick bccom
manageable in a mall subset of cases in which the public employee speech i found to
be completely unrelated to his or her public employment and i poken on the employee's
own time in a nonworking setting. See United States v. at I Treasury (PSV Union,
513 U.S. 454, 465-66, 475 (1995).
179. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
180. /d. at 413- 15.
181. See id. at 417 ("The Court has made clear that public employees do not
urrender D O O their First Amendment right by rea on of their employment. Rather the
First Amendment protect ' a pllblic employee's right, in certain cir umstance , to speak
DV a citizen addre sing matters of public concern.").
182. ld. at 424. lntereslingly, thi holdjng that government worke1 cannot act a
employees and citizen ai the ame time cont.rovens a previous statement of the ourt
that a teacher making a presentation before a board of education  poke both as an
employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights." ity of Madi on -RLQW 6 F K 
Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. (mp't Relations Comm n 429 U . . 167 176 n. J  ( 1976).
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not have any First Amendment protection, and there was no need to
consider under Connick whether he spoke on a matter of public concern
or to conduct a Pickering balancing of interests. 183
Garcetti drastically cuts down on public employees' First Amendment
p ech rights. 184 ln the name of managerial prerogative, 185 federalism,
and eparation of powers 186 Garcetti has the effect of making government
les tran parent accountable and responsive. This is because public
emp loyees are now le
ecure in their ability to speak out against
govemmental fraud abu e and waste without facing retribution from
their public employer . 1 7 The Gar etti majority, rather than focusing on
the imp rtance of public employ es' ability to help ensure the
maintenance of an ac ountable and transparent government as the
Pickering Court did, focused instead on more sinister concerns about
employees' impairing the proper performance of efficient governmental
functions. The decision also inappropriately focu e on the forn1al
opportunity to still exercise constitutional rights, even though employee
cannot now exercise those rights while working and performing their
assigned duties. In all, then, Garcetti redefines the role public employees
should play in ensuring the fair and efficient administration of government
services. 188

183. See Garcefti, 547 U.S. at 421.
184. David L. Hudson Jr., Garcettized' '06 Ruling Still Zapping Speech, FIRST
AMENDMENT CTR. (Jan. 15, 2010), bttp://www.firstamendmentcenter.orgicommentary.
aspx?id=22501 ("[Garcetti] has led to the dismissal of legions of public-employee
lawsuits. lt bas threatened legitimate wbistleblowers wanting to speak out on impo11ant
matters of public con eUQ.").
185. See Lawrence Ro cnthal, The Emerging Fir t Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 2008) ('The ourt opinion [in GarceWWL
contains a sketch- concededly partial and omewhat ob cure-of managerial control
over employee speech as essential if management is to E H held politically accountable for
the performance of public institutions.").
186. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.. 587, 617 (2007)
(Kennedy, J. c ncurring) "The ourt K D refused to establish a constitutional UXOH that
would require or allow 'permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
pcrations to a degree incon i VWHQW with sound principles of federali m and the VHSDration
of power . "(quoting GarceWWi. 547 U. . at423)).
 7. See WatHU v. hurchill, S  U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)
("Government employ e arc often in the best position to know what ails the agencies
for which they w Uk.").
 8.
ee Helen orton Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's
ontrol of , W V Workers' Speech To Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009).
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B. Garcetti as a Subsidy Public Employment Case
Prior examination of Garcetti, however, does not sufficiently explain
how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been undermined in
the public employment free speech context. Thi i not your greatgrandfather legal formaJj m. To understand more fully how the sub idy
school of thought ha begun to hold way in case in which government
acts in its employment capacity it i neces ary to cons ider the Garcetti
majority's invocation of a line of argument H[WUDQHRXV to the Pickering
doctrine. 1 9
Thi line of argument involves a particular brand of sub idy argument.
rn coming to it cooclu. ion in Garcetti the majority commented that
HEDOO 's peech 'owe[d] its existence to >KLV@ professional respon ibilities
and "simply reflect the exercise or employer control over what the
employer itself ha commis ioned or created." 190 Justice outer pondered
aloud in his dissent ' [W]hy d tl1e majority' concern which we all
hare, require categorical exclu ion or First Amendment protection
against any official retaliation for lhings said on the job? ' 191 Tbe an wer
appears to b : Because the ubsidy approach require it.
Recall Lbe abortion-funding ·ubsidy case of .Rust v. Sullivan , 192 in
ZKLFKthe ourt held there wa no infringement of the speech rights of
Title X funds recipient and their taff: when the Govemment forbade
any on-the-job counseling in fa or of abortion a a method of family
planning.' 193 A corollary to this sub idy argument later developed by
lhe Court i that 'when the govemment appropriates public funds to
pr mote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say wbal it
wishe V 194
ln Garcetti rather than ub idizing a public health program and
" imply insisting that public fund be spent [by doctors] for the purpo es
for which they were authorized 195 the Court i in es VHQFH saying that
public employment itself is "subsidized by the government and thus the
govemment is entitled to say what it wishes through it government
employee without worrying about the e ame emp loyee Fir t
Amendment free speech right . Thus when an employee peaks out of
tum like Assistant District Attorney Ceballos in the Garcetti case-or
189. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 421- 22 (majority opinion).
19 I. I d. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
I92. Rustv.Sullivan,500U.S.173, I77-78(1991).
193. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 192200).
194. /d. (quoting .Ro enberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 5 I 5 U.S. 819,
833 (1995)) (inteUQal quotation marks omitted).
195. Rust, 500 U6at L96.
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p rhaps this rea oning ven applies to Mr. Pickering him elf- the
employee is no longer engaged in government speech. He or he i al o
without Fir t Amendment protection according the Court becaus tb
g vemment employer need not sub idize pe ch of which it doe not
approve. 196
The C urt thu doc nothing le s than turn the uncon litutional
conditions doctrine n it head by aying that the government employer
i not onditioning public employment on public employees' forfeiting
th ir 1ight to speech but instead i merely requiring that it sub idized
peech- in the mouth of its employee- be u ed to promote the
particular p licies for which the employee was hired.
Now a Ju tice uter poin out in his Garcetti di ent the c mparison
between the ub idization f peech in Rust and Garcetti is totally
inapt. 197 Wherea GRFWRU are only allowed to take Title X fu nd if they
agree not to promote abortion, most public employees do not take their
jobs on the condition that they say only what the go emment wants them
to ay. 19 Thj is not to ay tbat uch policymaking public employees do
not exi t but employee like Pickering, Myer and eballo are hired to
p rform a discretionary function not to SDUURWthe government. t99
<HW by treating all public employee as merely promoting govemment
speech the Garcetti court d e nothing less than tran form government
mployment back into a privil ge. Justice Ho lme ' ob ervation i one
again apposite: [A public employee] may have a con titutional right to
talk politic but he has no con titutional right to be a policeman."200
imilarly, under Garcetti conception public schoo l teacher di trict
attorney , or p lice officer may have the right to talk politi on their
own time but tho e empl yees have no right to publi employment if
196. Under the goveUQPHnt pcech doctrine, individual can be compelled to parrot
govemment speech with ut implicating any individual First Amendment right . ee
Johanns v. Live tock Mktg. As ·'n 544 U.S. 550 559 (2005).
197.
ee G(lrcetti 547 U.. at 43 ( outer. J., di senting) ( '[T]hc c interest. on the
govemmcnt's part are ntirely distin t from any claim that Ceballos
peHch was
government pecch wid1 a pre et or proscribed content as exemplified in Rusr.'').
19 . In thi regard. Ju tice utcr notes that"[ ]ome public employee arc hired to
'promote a particular policy' by broadcasting a particular me Vsage VHW by the
government but not everyone working for the govcmmcnt after all, i hired to speak
from a govemmcnt manifesto." ,G at 437 (citing Legal ervs. orp. v. Vcla7.qu z, 53l
U.. 533, 542 (20 l)).
199. Pickering wa certainly not hired W R parrot the Board line though the Board
would have ertainly liked him not to be . uch a nuisance.
200. McAllliffev. Mayorof cwBcdford,29 .·. 517, 517(Mas.l892).

943

they wish to engage in on-duty speech the government does not sanction.
To do so, according to the majority in Garcetti, would be tantamount to
requiring the government to subsidize employee speech that the government
does n t approve.
l.:n bort under the government speech doctrine, completely absent in
Pickering the ubsidy school of jurisprudential thought has eviscerated
th uncon titutiona l conditions doctrine in public employment. What is
left is a neoformalism that permits the Court to say that as long as
employees have a formal opportunity to exercise their constitutional
rights as citizens outside of their on-job work responsibilities, nothing
more is required to protect them from the penalty imposed by this
unconstitutional condition. This neofonnalism is particularly problematic
because of its insidious nature. Although much of the Garcetti decision
is clearly ba ed on traditional categorical distinctions between citizen
and employee: the majority ubsidy Justices also sneak in this observation
about t he connection between uncoQVWLWXWLRQDO conditions and the
government speech doctrine. The problem is that once lower federal
courts begin to treat public employee speech as equivalent to government
peech even le of a pos ibiJity ex ist that the peech will gamer any
constitutional protection. So although public employee free peech
right are SUHV ntly in the process of fading away, an expansion of this
government peech doctrine to encompas mo t government emp loyees
would be outright catastropJ1ic for the e emp loyees' constitutional rights
in the workplace.
Consider the impact of this neoformalistic approach on just one
subsequent case, though there are many examples in the four years since
Garcetti.201 In Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, a police officer was
fired for complaining about the incompetence of his superior in reducing
training for the canine unit and for asserting his belief that these actions
would adversely affect public safety. 202 Before Garcetti, the police
officer actually survived summary judgment at the district court level on
his First Amendment retaliation claim because he was clearly speaking
out on a matter of public concern. 203
After Garcetti, however, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the officer's
claim. Once the court classified the officer as a "public employee
carrying out his professional responsibilities," 204 from that point forward
he was robbed of citizen status and was considered a mere employee
without constitutional protections. Remarkably, the court hinted that if
201.
202.
203.
204.
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See Hudson, supra note 184.
Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 359 (6th Cir. 2007).
ld. at 364.
ld. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006)).
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the police officer had taken his gripe outside the police department and
written a letter to a newspaper editor criticizing the city's canine
program-much in the way Pickering brought his complaints about his
school to the public-he could have received First Amendment protection?05
The perverse incentive thus established by Garcelli i for employee
such as the officer in Haynes not to bring their con ern and complaint
through internal dispute mechani m but rather to make any workp lace
disagreement into a pubJj affair. Altho·ugh one would think uch an
outcome flies in the face of Pickering concem f ensuring the efficiency
of govermnental service, nevertheless the neofonnalist approach of
Garcetti leads to this absurd result.
Vl. EMBRACING THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF NEOFORMALISM
The neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights in the public
employment context has made the government less transparent and
accountable because public employees are now less secure in speaking
ab ut their public employm nt. It is therefore important to restore the
vitality of the w1con titutional conditions doctrine through a restoration
of Pickering it con tiLutional balancing standards, and the penalty
v r ion of the uncon titutional conditions doctrine. Only when
government action that practically trw1cate or impinge on the right of
public employee are no longer tolerated will public employees again be
able to be the vanguard of the citizenry, protecting all citizens against
govermnent fraud, waste, and abuse.

A. A Return to Pickering's First Principles
Pickering itself is a penalty case. Consider that Pickering himself was
not hired to paUUot the government line of the employer. Indeed, he
wrote specifically "as a citizen" when he wrote his letter to the Lockport
Herald 206
The Pickering Court recognized that there was a potential of
govermnent abuse if Pickering were able to be fired merely because "the
best interests" of the school required it. That line of argument, adopted
by the Illinois Supreme Court majority in Pickering, would have held the
constitutional rights of Pickering and others at the mercy of school
205.
206.

ld. (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422) .
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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officials. The majority opinion in Pickering rejected the subsidy argument
and adopted the penalty view that a substantial burden on a public
employee's free speech rights would be considered unconstitutional
unless narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
Not only is the approach taken by the subsidy Justices in subsequent
public employee free speech cases not narrowly tailored in that its
approach is being applied to employees who are not hired to parrot the
government line,207 but the government interest being advanced is
downright inimical to the idea of an open and transparent democratic
society. Pickering spends much time discussing the importance of
having teachers and other public employees who work for the
government infRUm the rest of us about the events that transpire in the
government workplace. These employees are ideally placed to sound the
alarm when government is no longer acting in the best interest of its
people. Through its holding in Garcetti, however, the Court has now
made it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to speak out
in the best interests of the public without jeopardizing their careers.
Under Pickering, it was not seen as inconsistent that the same person
could be both an effective government employee and an outspoken
citizen concemed for the greater society. 208 Under this broader conception
of public employment, there was no intemal tension within these citizenemployees because when they spoke publicly to point out an injustice in
government or to right a govemment wrong, not only were they making
their own workplace better but they were making society better as well?09
The Court itself developed this idea that public employees play a unique
role in a representative democracy in Pickering and other cases. 210 Given
207. Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent suggests ample reason why the
govemment speech analysis should be mostly extraneous to the Pickering doctrine.
* D U F H W W L  547 U.S. at 428 (Souter, J. , dissenting). He notes that "[s]ome public
employees are hired to 'promote a particular policy' by broadcasting a particular
message set by the government, but not everyone working for the govemment, after all,
is hired to speak from a government manifesto." ld. at 437 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)) .
208. Accord id. at 432 ("[T]he very idea of categorically separating the citizen's
interest from the employee's interest ignores the fact that the ranks of public service
include those who share the poet's 'object ... to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation."'
(second alteration in original) (quoting Robe1t Frost, Two Tramps in Mud Time, in
COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 251 , 252 (R. Poirer & M. Richardson eds., 1995))).
209. !d. ("[T]hese citizen servants are tl1e ones whose civic interest rises highest
when they speak pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly the ones govemment
employers most want to attract.").
210. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. , 391 U.S . 563 (1968) ("Teachers are, as a class,
the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to
how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is
essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of
retaliatory dismissal."); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per
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the sheer size of American government, it is impossible for ordinary
citizens to keep tabs on everything their government is doing at any
given time. Government employees therefore must be the vanguard of
the citizenry. This is so not only because of their physical proximity to
the problem but also because of their special expertise in dealing with
the governmental issues that come to their attention. Only the realist
approach of the penalty Justices, which recognizes the practical
consequences of government burdens on public employees' constitutional
rights, pe1mits these employees to cany out their essential role.
B. Constitutional Balancing as an Antidote to
Neoformalist Reasoning

As discussed above, Garcetti's government speech doctrine has the
ability to wreak havoc on public employees' remaining constitutional
rights in a large subcategory of public employee free speech cases by
taking away public employees' Pickering rights?" By writing broad job
descriptions, government employers can claim that they are disciplining
employees only for govetrunent speech by employees. Because employees
can claim no constitutional protection for such speech, employers are
free to sanction employees who write or speak in a way that is not in the
best interest of Lheir employer in other words, this is exactly the theory
of law that existed prior to W K H development of the Pickering doctrine.
ballo did
In this regard recall the ourt maj ri ty in Garcelli found
not have Fir t Amendment ri ght b cau e the speech at is ue ' ow [d] its
existence to [his] professional responsibilities" and "simply reflects the
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created." 2 12 In making this point, the Court-in a
parenthetical-draws language from the case of RosenbeUger v. Rector

curiam) ("The Court has recogni zed the right of employee to peak on matters of public
concern, typica lly matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the
public at large, a subject on which public employees arc uniquely qualified to
comment").
2 11.
ee GarceWWL, 547 U . . at 4 8 ( outer, J., di scnting) ("The I D O O D F \ of th
PDMRULW\ s reliance on Rosenb Hrger' under WDQGLQJ of Rust doctrine .. . portendV a
bloated notion of c ntrollable government speech going well beyond the circumstances
of this cas .' ): ee al o id. D W 437 (.. Rust i n authority for the n tion WKDW the
goveUQP ·nt may exercise plenary control over every commcut made by D public empl yeH in
doing his job.").
212. See id. at 421 - 22 (majority opinion).
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213

which stated that "when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a paUWLFXODUpolicy of
its own it is entitled to say what it wishes." 214 This language in turn was
taken from similar language in the abortion-funding case of Rust v.
Sullivan, 215 which, of course, relies on neoformalistic reasoning? 16
The solution to this neofonnalist approach is to push for more
standards and balancing of interests than bright-line rules. Consider that
Judge Po ner d Lines legal foUPD1ism a "enabling a commentator to
pronounce the outcome of the case a being conect or incorrect in
approximately the ame way that lhe olution to a math matical problem
can be pronounced a c rrect or incorrect."2 17 Of cour e a Judge Noonan
has pointed out, what i l s t in uch a mecbani tic approach to the law i
that the problem of real people become 'gri t for the con titutional
mill. ,218
A practical, realist approach, on the other hand, has judges decide the
case so that the decision attempts to promote the public welfare. Given
the inevitable conflict of interest between employee speech rights and
employer efficiency intere t in th se public employment free speech
cases, the constitutional balan ing et out by Pickering is perfectly
suited to provide an outcome ba ed on Lhe pecific circumstances of
different cases. In thi, vein, Justice Blackmun suggested in the Rust
case that constitutional balancing of relevant interests would lead away
from a conclusion that was "insensitive and contrary to common human
experience. " 219
Rather than blindly following a neoforrnalist analysis, which
asks whether a formal opportunity exists in another forum to exercise
constitutional rights, all in the service of more predictable rules, the
realist approach of constitutional balancing is consistent with notions of
social justice. It is also consistent with the penalty approach to the
213. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
214. Garcelti, 547 U.S. at 422; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
215. Rustv. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,174-75 (1991).
216. See id. at 192-93 ("[G]overnment may 'make a value judgment favoring
childbit1h over abortion, and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds."' (quoting Maher v. Roc, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))).
2 17.
ee Posner, supra note 147,at l 1.
2 18.
OONAN supra note 146, at 144 ("For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it
appears to proceed in these [federalism] cases wi th an agenda, the facts are of minor
importance and the person affected arc w rthy of almo st no altcntion. . . . T h e people
nnd their problems that have been gri t for the constitutionnl mill arc incidental.").
2 19. One of the approaches that Justice Blackmun suggest in hi dissent in Rust is
bala.ncing t h e govemment' interest in promoting a certain type of family planning
against the First Ameodmen t.ri ghts of doctors and the Fifth Amendment substant ive due
process rights o f pregnant women. See Rust 500 U . . at 213- 14 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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unconstitutional condition do trine in requiring judge to pra ctically
consider the actua l impact that penaliziug employee ' free . peech will
have on their constitutional rights. P rhap mo t importantly it huts the
door on the reemerging neoforma li t-in pired right-priv ilege distinction of a
long-ago discredited age.
VII. CONCLUSION
Neoformalism has slowly insinuated itself into the unconstitutional
condition doctrine over the years, without many commentators noticing
the large role it now plays in substantially reducing the constitutional
1ights of all sorts of individuals, but perhap especially public employ es.
Through the use of the subsidy line of argument under the do trine of
unconstitutional conditions, the notion advanced by the majority in Garcetti
is that public employee speech is nothing more than government speech
when these employees speak pursuant to their official duties. In this
manner, neoformalism has wreaked havoc on the Pickering doctrine and
reinvigorated the right-privilege distinction in constitutional law. A
fonnal opportunity to exercise a con titutional right is simply not the same
thing as the practical ability to exerci e tho rights .
This neoformalistic approach adopted by the majority in Garcetti is
contrary to good government. Without the ability of public servants to
bring to light govermnent's baser practices without jeopardizing their
careers, all citizens suffer from the resulting lack of government
transparency and accountability. This is especially so at a time when it is
harder for ordinary citizens to keep track of all the myriad depattments
that make up federal, state, and local government. In fact, Garcetti's
pigeonholing of public employees as mere employees does not comport
with how most employees view themselves. Nor does it comport with
the reality of the modern public workplace, where employee-citizens
discuss and speak out on issues of public concem as a matter of course.
This Article therefore argues in favor of reestablishing First Amendment
protections for public employees who speak out on matters of public
concern. Such employees should not have to rely on statutmy whistleblowing or civil service protection which may not protect tl1eir pecific
activity and which, unlike the First Am .n dment may nol apply to all
levels of government and to all jurisdictions. lnstead Garcetti' overbroad
government speech doctrine must be limited to appropriate cases in
which employees are actually hired to transmit a specific govemment
message. This necessary doctrinal transformation can be accomplished
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through a recommitment to Pickering's penalty version of the doctrine
ofunconstitutional conditions, with its emphasis on constitutional balancing
and a recognition that employees should not always have to relinquish
vital constitutional rights in order to enjoy the benefits of public
employment.
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